Jew and Noahide: The Two-Story Model

The question

Someone who stole, or even murdered, is seen by many as a religious Jew who sinned. And someone who desecrates Shabbat or eats non-kosher food is seen as someone who does not keep the mitzvot. Yet murder is far more serious than eating non-kosher meat. So what determines this distinction? We will return to the question at the end.

The seven Noahide laws

The Gemara (Sanhedrin 56a) lists seven mitzvot commanded to all human beings: establishing courts of law, not blaspheming God, not worshipping idols, not committing forbidden sexual relations, not murdering, not stealing, and not eating a limb torn from a living animal.

Maimonides (Laws of Kings 9:1) adds two important points:

1. These are mitzvot toward which “reason inclines”: a sensible person understands them on his own.

2. They are the first stage of a single development: Adam was commanded six, Noach added the limb of a living animal, Abraham was commanded circumcision, Isaac set aside tithes, Jacob added the sciatic nerve, “until Moses our teacher came and the Torah was completed through him.”

The two points are connected. The seven mitzvot are the human foundation shared by all, and the rest of the mitzvot were built upon it.

Two kinds of composition

In halakha there are two ways of joining two things together (in the terms of the Rogatchover, drawn from the Guide for the Perplexed):

• A “fused” composition: the two parts merge into a single new entity.

• A “neighborly” composition: the two parts remain like neighbors, side by side.1

Hence the question: is a Jew a Noahide with an added story (“neighborly”), or an entirely new creation (“fused”)?

Two positions

Rav Kook grapples with the question. In his view, the original plan was two stories. But humanity became corrupt, and the Egyptian exile “refined” Israel until it became a “new creation” from head to toe.2

The book “Beit Yishai” presents two approaches:

• Israel is the “firstborn son” within humanity. So in the Mishnah (Avot 3:14): “Beloved is man, for he was created in the image of God… Beloved are Israel, for they are called children of God.” Every person is created in the image of God, and among them Israel is especially beloved.

• Israel is a different kind. According to the Kuzari, the Jew differs from a human being as a human being differs from an animal.

What is the difference in practice?

Rav Kook shows that even in the shared mitzvot, the details differ. For a Noahide, the law is determined by nature; for Israel, by halakha:

• The limb of a living animal: an animal that has been ritually slaughtered but is still convulsing. A Noahide may not eat from it, since it is still alive. A Jew may, since the slaughter has been done (Chullin 33a).

• Lineage: a Noahide’s lineage follows his mother, who is certain by nature. A Jew’s lineage follows his father, by force of a halakhic presumption.

• Age of obligation: for a Noahide there is no age 13. He is obligated from the moment he understands.

At first glance, this is proof that Israel is a new creation. But not necessarily. According to the Ramchal (Derech Hashem), Noahides are meant to live in a well-ordered natural world, and therefore their laws are determined by nature. Israel is meant to influence all of reality, physical and spiritual, and therefore has additional mitzvot of a different kind. The second story influences the first, but does not erase it.

So too Rabbenu Nissim Gaon (in his introduction to the Talmud): all the mitzvot that depend on reason bind all human beings “from the day God created man upon the earth.”

It is hard to determine in theory when a difference becomes a new entity. But in practical halakha the question has clear consequences, and all of them point to two stories.

The consequences: two stories

1. A case between a Jew and a non-Jew. When a Jew and a non-Jew come before a court, by which law are they judged? Maimonides (Laws of Kings 10:12) rules that with a ger toshav (a non-Jew who keeps the seven laws), the case is judged by Noahide law. Why precisely by that law? The “Beit Yishai” explains: Noahide law is the law of human justice and fairness, and it binds Israel too. That is why it is the common ground of both parties.

2. The mitzvah of “courts”: the dispute between Maimonides and Nachmanides. One of the seven Noahide laws is “courts” (dinim). What does it include?

• According to Maimonides (Laws of Kings 9:14): Noahides must appoint judges in every district, to judge the people on the other six mitzvot.

• According to Nachmanides (Genesis 34:13): the mitzvah of courts also includes the civil law given to Israel, such as theft and fraud. Noahide courts must judge exactly like a Jewish court.

According to Nachmanides, Jewish law and Noahide law share a common foundation. But according to Maimonides they are two different systems: Noahide law is a law of human justice and fairness, and Torah law is a different system. Does this contradict the two-story model?

The answer is found in the words of the Ran.

3. Torah law and the king’s law. The Ran (Derashot, discourse 11) writes that Israel has two legal systems. Torah law is meant to bring down the divine flow, and so it does not always order society in the best way. The king completes it, according to the rules of justice and fairness. In other words, the king’s law is in fact Noahide law, and Israel too is bound by it.

It follows that even according to Maimonides, justice and fairness bind Israel, through the king’s law. That is why, when a Jew and a ger toshav come to court, they are judged by Noahide law: it is the common ground of both.

4. “Two hundred includes one hundred.” The Gemara (Sanhedrin 59a) rules: a mitzvah stated to the Noahides and repeated at Sinai was stated to everyone. A mitzvah stated to the Noahides and not repeated at Sinai was stated only to Israel. Why to Israel and not to the Noahides? Because “there is nothing permitted to a Jew and forbidden to a non-Jew.” And Rashi explains: when Israel left the category of Noahides, “they left it to become holier, not to make things easier for themselves.” In other words, a Jew is a Noahide with an additional story.

5. A Jewish child. Some Acharonim wrote that a Jewish child is bound by the Noahide laws even before age 13, from the moment he understands them. After all, a non-Jewish child is bound by them from that moment, and a Jew cannot be lesser than a non-Jew.

6. The prohibition of theft. Rabbi Shimon Shkop (Sha’arei Yosher) explains: the prohibition of theft is not based only on the Torah’s command, but on “the laws of justice” (dinei hamishpatim), the human laws that determine who owns what. The Torah only adds to them the prohibition “You shall not steal.” Therefore, even according to the views that stealing from a non-Jew is not a Torah prohibition, there is a legal prohibition. Once again: a human story, with a halakhic story above it.

Why keep the first story?

If the first story is based on reason, do we keep it only because it is logical? Maimonides (Laws of Kings 8:11) answers no. A non-Jew who keeps the seven laws “because his reason leads him to” is not “one of the pious of the nations,” but “one of their wise.” The pious one is he who keeps them because God commanded them. The same is true of a Jew (Commentary on the Mishnah, Chullin 7:6): we do not refrain from eating a limb of a living animal because it was forbidden to the Noahides, but because it was forbidden to us at Sinai.

In other words, there are two stories, but both are part of the service of God. Even human morality is not an independent morality, but part of God’s will.

Back to the question

Now we can understand why a thief is considered “religious,” and someone who eats non-kosher food is not. Aristotle already taught: to define something, one states its general genus, and then what distinguishes it. For example, man is a “living being” (the genus) “that speaks” (the distinction).

So too a Jew: he is a “human being” (the first story), distinguished by the mitzvot of the second story. Whoever wants to know whether someone keeps Judaism examines what is unique to Judaism, not what is shared by all human beings. Just as we do not check whether Reuven is a human being by the fact that he has legs.

This does not mean that the unique mitzvot are more important. A murderer damages the foundation itself, and so his sin is more serious. But Jewish identity is measured by what makes it distinctive. This is a logical distinction, not a judgment about the severity of the sins.