Mitzvot of Action and Mitzvot of Result: A Study of the Commandment to Procreate

A Jew is commanded to bring two children into the world – a son and a daughter. On the face of it, this is a clear-cut “mitzvah of result”: the Torah is interested in continuity, not in the actions that lead to it. Yet the result is not in a person’s hands but in Heaven’s – all that is in his hands is the action. It may therefore be that halakha defines the mitzvah as a “mitzvah of action”, even though what it really wants is the state of affairs itself.

Proofs that it is a mitzvah of result

• Halakha requires that a person have a son and a daughter, and that they themselves also have a son and a daughter – fulfillment is measured by an existing state of affairs, not by the performance of an action.

• One whose children were born and then died has not fulfilled the mitzvah, even though he performed the action.

• According to several Rishonim, one who fathers a mamzer (a child of a forbidden union) fulfills the mitzvah, and there is no problem of “a mitzvah brought about through a transgression” (fulfilling a mitzvah by means of a sin) – because the transgression and the mitzvah do not occur at the same moment.1

• A gentile who fathered children and then converted has discharged the obligation to procreate – what is required is that he actually have descendants, even if they were born while he was exempt.2 Consequently, the first son born after his conversion is not considered a firstborn for the purpose of the double share of the inheritance (Yevamot 62a).

A proof that it is a mitzvah of action

A slave belonging to two masters – one of whom freed his share while the other did not – is half slave and half free. He may not marry a Jewish woman (since he is still half slave) nor a maidservant (since he is already half free), so the court compels the second master to free him completely. Tosafot (Bava Batra 13a) ask: why is compulsion needed? The mitzvah of procreation should override the prohibition (“a positive commandment overrides a negative one”). They answer that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition only when both occur at the very same moment; but here the prohibition takes place at the start of the act (ha’ara’ah), while the mitzvah is fulfilled only at its completion (gemar bi’ah).

Hence: what is incumbent on the person is the act of intercourse itself, while the result (the birth) is not entirely under his control – even though the purpose of the mitzvah is precisely the result.

Implications

• A woman who conceives from bathwater containing semen, without any intercourse or act on the father’s part. The practical difference for the mitzvah of procreation: there is a result (a son or daughter), but no action whatsoever by the father. Several poskim (Beit Shmuel, Even HaEzer 1:28; Beit Shmuel ibid. §10) wrote that he has fulfilled the mitzvah.

• A further question sharpens here: do mitzvot require intent? According to the view that they do – must the intent be specifically at the time of intercourse, or is intent at the time of birth (the mitzvah itself) sufficient? It seems that, according to all views, mitzvot of result do not require intent.

• Cooking and sowing on Shabbat: does the prohibition apply to the result (the actual cooking, the actual taking root) or to the act itself (placing on the fire, placing in the ground)? Practical difference: someone who placed a pot on the fire before Shabbat and the food cooked on Shabbat itself. Likewise, someone who sowed on Shabbat and picked the seed out of the ground on a weekday before it took root. Does it turn out retroactively that he is exempt?

• Circumcision – going back over shreds of skin (small remnants of skin at the site of the circumcision) that do not invalidate it: according to the Tur (Yoreh De’ah 264), one does not go back over them on Shabbat but does on a weekday; according to Maimonides, one never goes back over them. This depends on whether the mitzvah is “to circumcise” (the action, which ends once it is finished) or “to be circumcised” (the state, which can continue to be improved).

• Charity: is it a mitzvah of action (giving, which improves the giver’s character) or a mitzvah of result (improving the poor person’s situation)? The Talmud itself appears to contradict itself on this point, and Maimonides’ words suggest a resolution: in the prohibition (“you shall not harden your heart”, commandment 192) the emphasis is on the giver, that he not acquire a trait of stinginess; in the positive commandment (“you shall surely give”, commandment 232) the emphasis is solely on improving the poor person’s situation.

A third possibility: there are no mitzvot of result at all

Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank proposes distinguishing between fulfilling a mitzvah and becoming exempt from it: one who fathers a mamzer, or who fathered children while a gentile, has not fulfilled the mitzvah – but is already exempt from it, because the desired result has in fact been achieved. On this view there are, in practice, no “mitzvot of result” at all: at most there are “mitzvot of action that require the attainment of a result” – and when the result is achieved without the action, there is no fulfillment, but there is an exemption.

The reason for a mitzvah versus its definition

Maimonides (Sefer HaMitzvot, second principle) rules that we do not expound reasons, even when the Torah itself reveals them. A possible explanation: when it comes to mitzvot of action, what determines the details of the law is the action – not the result. So even when the reason (= the desired result) is known, it cannot determine the details of the halakha. Why? Sometimes because the result does not depend on the person at all (as with having children), and sometimes for other considerations.

Caution: this argument is almost too strong

There is a problem: the same argument can be raised for almost every mitzvah, and then it no longer says anything. One can always claim “the reason merely explains why this action was chosen, but in practice only the action is decisive” – even when there is no real basis for this. The argument is weakened (and precisely for that reason becomes more convincing) in a case where the result itself depends entirely on the person, such as building a parapet: there the action (the building) and the result (preventing a fall) are essentially the same thing – so that is exactly where it is hard to claim a difference between the reason and the definition.